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In recent decades, the increasing amount of companies’ CSR efforts led to a growing concern 
on how social actions affect stock prices. Different studies have produced contradictory results 
and no universal relationship could be drawn.  
This thesis responds to the increasing interest on the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and firm’s value. It will do so by analyzing whether the inclusion and exclusion 
on Euronext Vigeo Europe 120 has a significant impact on European stock prices on the short-
term or medium-term, whether it depends on the geographical position (Western vs Central 
Eastern Europe) or industry group (highly pressured vs low pressured sectors).  
An event study is conducted and the average abnormal returns of 166 unique stocks is analyzed 
for the period of 2013 to 2017.  Results show a short-term positive and negative impact for 
index inclusion and exclusion; with no medium-term effect detected for either event. Central 
European countries are the most negatively affected by index composition. The highly-
pressured sector is the most positively affected for inclusion, with no sector differentiation for 
exclusion. 
The work project presents a few limitations such as a small sample size and the assumption of 
high visibility of the index. As future and complementary approach, it would be of interest to 
analyze other Euronext Vigeo Indices and compare the results as well as to understand the 






Corporate Social Responsibility is a concept with many definitions, views and applications. In 
a broad sense, it is a business approach that contributes to sustainable development.  It achieves 
that by delivering economic, social and environmental benefits to all stakeholders. The 
European Union states that CSR has to be seen as a behavior of the business that goes beyond 
the legal requirements (European Commission, 2011). Moreover, companies have their own 
values, own ideologies on social responsibility and, also, what it means for them to act in a 
socially responsible manner while creating value for themselves. The European Commission 
believes that CSR is important for competitiveness, sustainability and innovation of the EU 
companies and economy. They strongly encourage enterprises to adhere to international 
guidelines and principles related to CSR. There is, in fact, a European CSR awards and the 
European business network for CSR, all to promote CSR practices and collaboration across 
Europe. The EU believes CSR initiatives will bring benefits to the companies, in cost saving, 
risk management, access to capital, customer relationships and human resource management.  
According to the World Bank (Mazurkiewicz, 2008), CSR is a company’s obligation to be 
accountable to all of its stakeholders in its operations and activities They believe that socially 
responsible companies must consider their impact on communities and environment in the 
moment of making decisions, while balancing profits with the needs of stakeholders. 
 
There are several theories explaining CSR, but the Stakeholder Theory is the most commonly 
accepted. It has become a corner stone in both CSR thinking and business ethics. The theory 
postulates that CSR is pursued in order to understand and satisfy stakeholders (any group or 
individual who can be affected or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives (Freeman, 1984)) and could be a way to develop a successful business. For a long 
time, the only goal of a company was to be profitable and create value for its shareholders 
(Friedman, 1970). Nowadays, more and more this idea is changing. Companies are increasingly 
affected by stakeholder relations that cover a wide range of interests. In this sense, CSR appears 
as a way to fulfil the gaps as it becomes clear that without satisfying their stakeholders, 
companies cannot satisfy their shareholders. A company must clarify its most important 
stakeholder relationships and systematically evaluate how its objectives and plans affect them. 
In fact, efforts to integrate CSR practices in their business models have been increasing greatly 
because many companies take as their responsibility to build a better environment to the overall 




conditions, improving communities in poor countries, among others). However, CSR means 
different things to different companies, but generally each CSR program will fall under one of 
the following categories: Environment, Economic, Human Rights and Philanthropic work 
(Scott Krohn, 2018). Environment category relates to a business implementation of non-
wasteful actions; economic category deals with fiscal responsibility (ethical and transparent 
bookkeeping) and procedures to minimize wasted capital; human rights category relates to 
human rights; philanthropic works may involve a company’s investment or funding of 
communities. 
 
Companies have established comprehensive CSR programs to fight against serious issues in the 
world, both on a global and local level. These seemingly altruistic plans do not only help 
improve the world, but also may increase a company’s value. Since the 1960s, the relationship 
between CSR and company’s financial performance has been under some serious debates. 
Many studies have appeared as a consequence in the pursuit to draw conclusions on the topic. 
Some studies on the issue prove that announcements on CSR practices have a positive effect 
on stock performance (e.g. Chollet and Cellier, 2011),  a negative effect (e.g. Mackey et al., 
2007) or no effect at all (e.g. Zaccheaus et al., 2014). The mix results considering different 
stock markets make conclusions on the subject difficult.  
It is clear that consumers value and trust companies who are involve in CSR initiatives. 
Following that reasoning, a question emerges: does the same happen with investors? Do 
investors care about social responsible practices and reward companies for that or do they view 
them as a waste of resources? In this thesis, I contribute to the literature by analyzing the impact 
that Euronext Vigeo Europe 120 Index composition announcement has on the stock 
performance of publicly traded European companies, both in short and medium term, also, 
whether it depends on the geographical location or industry group. The analysis of the inclusion 
effect offers a good opportunity to understand the possible impact of CSR ratings on financial 
markets. To my knowledge, none of the previous studies have taken this approach. The insights 
from this thesis could be useful for both investors and managers in their decision-making. 
The index effect can be considered as the phenomenon of abnormal returns and/or abnormal 
trading volumes that stocks may experience when they are included or excluded from a 
particular index. This topic inclusion effect has been widely studied in the literature but most 
on US market (in the context of S&P 500). There seems to be a strong empirical evidence on 
the short-term positive price effects of index inclusion (e.g. Cheung, 2011). However, the long-




such as increase of exposure, attention and demand shocks, additionally, some effects are also 
considered such as liquidity and information effect (Chakrabarti et al., 2005).  In recent years, 
several indices have emerged to rank and list companies according to environmental, social and 
government criteria. The objective of this approach is to identify and compensate sustainable 
companies. Indices such as Vigeo Eiris, Dow Jones and Financial Times provide reliable 
benchmarks of sustainable companies to investors. In fact, information on the announcements 
of corporate initiatives related to CSR are gathered by company’s such as Vigeo. Their indices 
are composed of the highest-ranking listed companies as evaluated by the agency in terms of 
their performance in corporate responsibility (Vigeo Eiris website). They consider at European 
level the top 120 most advanced companies. The composition of the index is done on a semi-
annual basis. Moreover, they have indices at global level, European level, Eurozone, emerging 
markets, United States, France, UK and Benelux. This thesis only will focus on the European 
level. It is interesting to analyze the index inclusion effect of a CSR index particularly because 
there is little extensive literature about it and no literature mentioning the specific Vigeo index. 
Many researchers have questioned the effects of CSR on a company’s financial performance as 
it becomes a central theme for companies, managers and investors. It is of relevance to get an 
estimate of the financial effects of CSR, as this is likely to have an impact on companies’ future 
CSR efforts. Those are undeniably essential in the world, since they help improve and tackle 
innumerous problems. If it is possible to prove that CSR practices have a positive effect on a 
company’s s stock performance on top of helping the world be a better place, perhaps this would 
mean that more companies would expand their CSR investments in a more meaningful way, 
beyond the required levels. If the contrary proves to be true, such that if the results are negative 
or no effect is observed, then companies can financially benefit from ceasing their CSR 
initiatives or at least not report them. Hence, the relevance of this topic cannot be undermined. 
 
Section 2 summarizes the main results of different studies on the topic, Section 3 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 discusses the methodology and reports the findings. Finally, 






In recent years, CSR initiatives have gained importance in corporations and, so, discussions 
about their effects have emerged. Some authors claim that CSR programs have a positive impact 
on the value of the company, while others claim that it has a negative or no impact at all. The 
uncertainty behind this topic has incentivized many researchers to further understand the 
relationship. Their researches differ as they take different approaches to solve the problem (e.g. 
multiple regression, event study, etc.), they consider different databases, different markets and 
different time periods, which makes any comparison difficult. Most studies conducted on the 
issue are specially focused on the US market, and even in the same market the findings vary. 
Furthermore, some studies look at a specific industry or a specific country. Other studies 
consider CSR rating as a whole or by its dimensions. A few even consider the effect of inclusion 
in CSR related index.  
At this part of the document, I will present the key findings of the studies conducted on the 
subject and try to solidify my reasoning for the next steps. The literature is divided taking into 
consideration the final conclusions regarding the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance, whether it is positive, negative or non-existent. Before starting the analysis, one 
aspect worth mentioning is the disclosure decision, which is the decision companies take to 
reveal their CSR information. Understanding the decision and the motivations behind is 
pertinent. Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) computed a regression model and concluded that the 
relevant explanatory variables are social performance and political visibility when a company 
decides to make public their social information. Moreover, Margolis and Walsh (2003) found 
that the higher the quality of CSR Report disclosed, the more significant is the market effect. 
Disclosure makes the company’s CSR policies public to investors and to index analysts. Index 
analysts gather that information and use their own criteria to rank companies, to posteriorly 
include the best ones into an index. Moreover, reputation seems to be an important factor, 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) analyzed how reputation is determined by social and financial 
performance. Conclusions show that the fit of the social activities with the company´s image is 
crucial. For instance, a good record of social initiatives may improve or destroy a reputation 
depending on the how those actions fit with the company’s business.  
 
Findings supporting a positive relationship 
A good example of research on the topic is the one conducted by Chollet and Cellier (2011). In 
their analysis, they study the influence of Vigeo rating announcements on short term European 




days around the announcement and that the market reacts differently depending on the CSR 
field. Länsilahti, (2012) conducted an event study on European stock returns affected by 
negative ESG-news (1998-2007). Research shows a negative market reaction in the short-run 
and positive market reaction in the long-run.  This implies that investors overreact to the news 
and that the short-term reaction is intensified over the years. 
There is extensive literature on U.S market regarding the relationship. For instance, Waddock 
and Graves (1997) suggest that better social performance leads to better financial performance 
and vice-versa, though the effect is relatively small. Another study by Flammer (2013) 
concerning the environmental awareness of shareholders concludes also positive results. The 
research led to the conclusion that on US companies (1980-2009) reporting responsible 
environmental actions have a significant stock price increase while companies who behave 
irresponsible experience a significant price decrease. Moreover, Giannarakis et al. (2016) 
investigates whether CSR impacts financial performance of the S&P 500 companies. The 
investigation is done in terms of involvement in socially responsible initiatives using the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) disclosure scores. The findings suggest that the 
involvement in socially responsible initiatives has a significantly positive effect on financial 
performance. Pintekova (2017) concluded the same when analyzing the relationship in the post-
financial crisis. The research goes further, determining that primary responsible activities (the 
ones related to the core business of the company) have a positive effect, while the secondary 
responsible activities do not affect substantially the financial results. Additionally, Arx and 
Ziegler (2008) compared companies’ environmental and social actions on their financial 
performance in two different regions, US and Europe. The analysis showed positive results for 
both, being more robust for the US.  Velde et al. (2005) study whether integrating sustainable 
dimensions in the investment policy carries a cost for investors. After estimating the model, it 
is clear that high sustainability rated portfolios perform better than low-rated portfolios on the 
short-term, with no apparent cost involved for conscious investing. Additionally, Kempf and 
Osthoff (2007) tested the effect of social responsible investment (SRI) on portfolio performance 
of US stocks using KLD ratings and concluded that social responsible investors can keep their 
trading strategy (investing in companies highly involved in CSR) without hurting their financial 
performance. Data shows that social responsible portfolios are never significantly negative. 
 
Findings supporting a negative relationship 
Zeiner and Johansen (2014) performed a study on American corporations and concluded that 




announcements might represent an anomaly to market efficiency. A similar study by Zhang 
(2017) on S&P 500 stocks (2000-2014) reached the conclusion that CSR aggregated rating 
score has a negative impact on the stock performance and on the development of the company. 
Another researcher, Valerie (2014), analyzed the effect of both CSR and CSI (corporate social 
irresponsibility) on U.S. stock returns on the short and long-run. CSI refers to a company´s 
inability to act in a responsible manner, it is the opposite of CSR. The results show a negative 
impact on both CSR and CSI, nonetheless, being the CSR announcements impact weaker on 
market returns. Mackey et al. (2007) tested whether socially responsible activities will have an 
impact (positive or negative) or no impact on a company´s market value. The study concluded 
that companies that change their policies by being socially responsible or irresponsible will see 
a decrease in their market value. It might be due to the fact that these actions will create excess 
supply in the market. 
 
Findings supporting a neutral or no existent relationship 
Moreover, there are studies that concluded no relationship between CSR and stock returns. 
Whelpley (2017) examined the effects of releasing annual CSR reports on stock prices and on 
trading volume. The study was conducted on two different sample groups (based on their 
market capitalization value) each with 20 companies from the S&P 500. The final results led to 
the conclusion that there is no significant relationship between releasing CSR reports and stock 
returns in either group. However, further analysis shows a significant response in trading 
volume for the group with higher market capitalization. There is evidence that the investors 
care about and act upon CSR information and it might depend on the information environment.  
Martins (2015) conducted a study on the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. The study showed 
no significant impact on the financial performance of a company either on the short or long 
term. Additionally, the study concluded that financial performance varies differently depending 
on the industry. Singh (2014) focus his study on the impact that CSR disclosure has on the 
financial performance of United Kingdom companies. The focus was specifically on three 
industries (industry of crude petroleum and natural gas extraction; mining of metal ores and on 
pharmaceutical products) and conclusions proved no significant CSR impact in both short and 
long-term. Cochran and Wood (1984) proposes a new methodology and the creation of 
industry-specific control groups in order to understand the relationship. In the end, they 
concluded that there is a weak correlation between CSR and financial performance. 
It has become increasingly popular for Swedish companies to invest in CSR to gain competitive 




a firm´s financial performance. For example,  Hagberg et al. (2015) tested whether there was a 
positive relationship between CSR and stock returns in the Swedish market, and whether 
industry or firm size were relevant factors. In the end, no significant relationship could be 
observed. Also, Ahlén and Ahlén´s (2012) performed a similar study, using stocks ranked by 
Folksam Index of Corporate Social Responsibility. In fact, Folksam, is one of Sweden’s largest 
investment and insurance companies, their report assesses the CSR engagement within 
environmental and human rights, for all companies on OMX Stockholm stock exchange. In this 
study companies with the highest CSR ranking, companies with the lowest ranking and 
companies with no ranking were selected to be a part of the study. Furthermore, the same 
method is applied to industry classifications to evaluate how the impact differs across 
industries. The results conclude that, overall, low ranking has a negative impact on a company’s 
share price and a high ranking has no impact. The effect, nevertheless, varies across industries, 
in specific, in real estate, health care and capital goods. Moreover, Bråtenius and Melin (2015) 
and Radgren and Akerling  (2015) had similar studies and conclusions. Final results show that 
the number of companies not engaging in CSR at all has decreased. It can be inferred that even 
though high ranked firms in CSR are not rewarded, companies are still punished for poor CSR 
performance. Additionally, results might imply that a firm with a lower ranking can create value 
for its shareholders by improving its CSR reporting systems. Companies with an efficient CSR 
reporting seem to gain more from the release of the index than firms with an inadequate 
reporting. This indicates that investors value companies with well-developed CSR policies.  
 
Index Inclusion effect 
Furthermore, a relevant and related aspect not much analyzed in the literature is the index 
inclusion effect on CSR related indices. More than ever companies want to be seen as socially 
and environmentally responsible but the credibility of those actions is sometimes questioned, 
being a part of a social responsible index is a way to overcome the distrust. Sustainability 
indices serve as informational intermediaries. They analyze the companies’ information reports 
and categorize them according to the previously set criterion. These intermediaries are seen as 
objective neutral professional institutions (Dubbink et al., 2008). Nevertheless, little research 
has been conducted on the topic, the overall conclusions on index inclusion suggest that there 
is a temporary positive index effect for the inclusion and a negative temporary effect for the 
exclusion, with no permanent effect detected. The index inclusion effect depends on the index 




The Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) identifies the leading sustainability-driven firms 
worldwide and their financial performance. The next three studies have been conducted on the 
topic, two are on the US market and present similar results, the last one is on the European 
market. Cheung (2011) in his study analyzes the effect of index inclusion and exclusion on 
corporate sustainable companies, by examining the performance of US stocks added and 
eliminated from the DJSI. Conclusions show that there is a temporary increase in stock return 
for included stocks and a temporary decrease for excluded ones. Robinson et al. (2011) study 
examines the same impact on US companies. In fact, results show similar conclusions. 
Inclusion increases the stock price while exclusion leads to a temporary decrease for the first 
10 days after the announcement, then the effect is eliminated, hence, being excluded from the 
index does not lead to a huge loss. Lopez et al. (2007) tries to understand the same problematic 
by comparing the results of companies in the DJSI with companies in the DJ Global Index but 
taking into account only companies that develop their business in Europe. Results show that 
there is a negative short-term effect on sustainability practices.  
Regarding European market indices, Blomstrand and Säfstrand (2010) studied the index effect 
on the EURO STOXX 50 and on the OMXS30. Results state that there are positive abnormal 
returns and abnormal trading volumes in the short term for both. Additionally, Kaptein (2016) 
studies the effect of index inclusions in the Dutch market proving also a positive effect. Even 
on emerging markets, the effects are positive as Hacibedel and Bommel (2007)  concluded. 
They attributed the reason for that impact to the radar screen effect: “more visible stocks attract 
more (distant) investors and hence require lower expected returns” (Merton, 1987).  Chakrabarti 
et al.´s (2005) study on MSCI indices effect, also, concluded that adding stocks to the index 
increases the volume and price. The study also presented cross-country variations regarding the 
effects, in their study they divide their sample into 5 sub-samples (US, UK, Japan, Developed 
and Developing countries) and concluded there were effects on UK and Japan.  
There is extensive literature on market index inclusion, specially, regarding S&P500 (Reuling 
(2016), Quinn and Wang (2013), Scari (2016), Kasch and Sarkar (2012)). In general, the studies 
prove a positive effect on the short-term. In particular, Denis et al. (2003) concludes that the 
S&P 500 index inclusion is not an information-free event and that is why it has a positive impact 
on a firm´s returns. The reason why is not exactly clear. It could be because newly added 
companies face higher scrutiny of management, or it is suggested that perhaps S&P 
(unknowingly) has access to more information than the one made public, or even better 




inclusion. Nonetheless, we cannot infer the same for CSR related index, those are different from 




It can be assumed this index inclusion is an information event as Vigeo takes into consideration 
the public information available and other complementary information companies agree to 
provide to its analysts in reply to specific questions, with that Vigeo constructs its indices based 
on their specific methodology (Equitics). The index adds value to the companies as it makes it 
clear to investors the best performing ones in terms of CSR. It is an information event and, 
therefore, should have an impact on the newly added or excluded companies. Vigeo has access 
to more information than the one made public, and even have superior analytical capabilities. 
Investors have these beliefs and respond to index inclusion. It is expected that Vigeo Eiris index 
inclusion will have a positive impact (if, in fact, investors value CSR initiatives) and exclusion 
a negative one. There are several reasons for that: it can lead to more attention to the company; 
it can lead to positive publicity and increase in reputation; also, performing CSR efforts might 
create a positive signaling effect for investors because it shows that the company has sufficient 
resources to invest in a project that does not directly generate revenues (Šontaitė-Petkevičienė 
(2015).  However, we should also consider the reasons for a negative relationship: it can lead 
to increase of attention which in turn can lead to problems. CSR efforts are normally expensive 
and they might be seen as an expense for the company as it does not generate income. Investors 
might see it as something that lowers the financial value. Also, it can lead to negative publicity, 
the company can be accused of doing good to increase its brand image. This negative publicity 
can lead to customer and investor loss, in the end, a decrease in stock returns (Księżak, 2017). 
Moreover, the impact might be noticeable on the short and/or medium-term. In fact, some 
scholars (e.g. Berman et al. 1999, Inoue and Lee 2011), defend that the impact of CSR measures 
on the financial performance of a company is different during the two-time lengths.  Thus, the 
first and second hypotheses are a starting point and will be further along tested. 
H1: The announcement of Euronext Vigeo Europe 120 index composition has a significant 
impact on the stock returns of European companies in short term. 
H2: The announcement of Euronext Vigeo Europe 120 index composition has a significant 
impact on the stock returns of European companies in medium-term. 
 
Europe is a continent made by many different countries, with different political regimes, 




have more rigorous laws for protecting the environment and society in general. Therefore, it is 
interesting to understand whether the impact of CSR on stock performance differs on European 
geographical location. The European Union views CSR as an opportunity for businesses to gain 
competitiveness and simultaneously help maintain a sustainable environemnt. Nordic countries 
such as Sweden and Finland are usually at the top of rankings concerning CSR, they seem to 
be a good example to follow. In particular, Scandinavian countries are considered to be very 
concious when dealing with CSR initiatives. They pay special attention to immaterial values 
beyond profit maximization, they value human rights, corporate ethics, corruption and working 
conditions. Whereas, for instance in Spain, CSR implementation has been a slow process with 
difficult integration. Business models are still adaping to CSR and there is still a lot of wok to 
be done as each country and each corportaion reacts at its own pace (Martín, 2009).  
There are three main aspects in every country that can influence a company social behavior: 
culture, economic context and formal institutions (law and regulations). In fact, the social-
economical, juridical and cultural context shape the perceptions and practices of companies and 
it has been long acknowledged in several management studies. Gjølberg (2009) article points 
out national patterns in CSR and how a nationality of a company is relevant in its CSR 
initiatives. The differences in CSR performance are observed by computing a model that 
considers the political economy of a country. In conclusion, divergences in capitalist models 
impact the business strategy and behavior in different ways, in fact, the institutional framework 
can create a prosperous environment for CSR or not. A study by Steurer et al (2011) on CSR 
in Europe concluded that Western European (UK and Sancadinavian) governments are much 
more active in promoting CSR than Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments. This 
study divides Europe according to their economical models and ideological tendencies: 
aggregating the Anglo-Saxon (UK and Ireland), Scandinavian (Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
the Netherlands) and Continental (GermanyFrance, Belgium and Luxembourg ) countries in 
the Western Europe group, the remaining countries Mediterraneam (Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Italy) and Transitional (New EU members from CEE) into CEE group.  
One might expect that CSR initiatives in Western European companies are expected, encourage 
and imposed, so (probably) news about a firm’s addition to the index will not have a strong 
impact on the stock performance. While CSR initiatives taken by Central and Eastern European 
companies are less expected and unrequired (by the government). Investors in those companies 
may view it as a waste of resources, reacting negatively to the news. These statements are made 
assuming investors tend to invest close to “home” (home bias effect) and, therefore, have the 




will probably face higher backlash for being eliminated compared to Western, because it will 
signal that the company is underperforming and has no longer the resources to keep investing 
in a non-profit practice. It will point out the bad management decisions previously taken. This 
differentiation of Europe regarding the Vigeo index has not yet been researched and this thesis 
proposes to test it in the following hypothesis. 
H3: The announcement of index composition has a stronger significant impact on the 
stock returns of on Central Eastern European companies than on Western companies.  
 
This next hypothesis sheds light on cross-industry variation by dividing the industry sectors 
into two distinct groups. CSR might have a stronger impact in some industries and a lesser 
impact on others, and industry context must play a role as companies do not operate in the same 
circumstances. They have different impacts on society due to the specific nature of their core 
business. It is, thus, normal that some are subject to higher media attention, public scrutiny and 
pressure to behave in a responsible manner (Martins, 2015). In this sense, it is necessary to 
make a clear distinction between industry sectors: “clean” industry sectors (e.g. banking, 
technology, telecommunications) and “dirty” industry sectors (e.g. chemical, automotive, 
mining, transport, construction, pharmaceutical and energy sectors) (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2015 
and Jänicke et al., 1997). The dirty sector generates above median environmental stress while 
the clean sector does not (Cassou and Hamilton, 2004). For the sake of research, the “dirty” 
sector will be denominated by highly-pressured sector and the “clean" by low-pressured sector. 
It is of interest to analyze how CSR index composition impacts the two groups and if the impact 
is significant. It should be expected a higher positive impact for the highly-pressured sector. 
The addition to the index signals a positive environmental and social behavior as they are under 
higher attention and CSR expenses are seen as necessary. The elimination, should have a higher 
(negative) impact on highly-pressure as they appear to be less invested in their CSR efforts and 
it might deteriorate their image. For the low-pressured firms, the addition might have a negative 
impact, as it can be seen as a waste of resources and a publicity stunt; the exclusion might have 
a negative impact as well, because it will signal the company is underperforming and it 
highlights previous bad management decisions, however, they are also under the radar (low 
public attention) in relation to CSR issues. 
H4: The announcement of index composition has a more significant impact on the stock 
returns of European companies that operate in industries with public pressure (“highly-






In order to investigates whether the announcement date of the index inclusion (exclusion) can 
create (significant) abnormal returns depending on time, industry and geographical location, an 
event study is conducted. The study is based on the premise that stock prices reflect all available 
information about the prospects of firms. The actual event is the date of the announcement of 
the index, the index is made public twice a year, on the 1st of June and on the 1st of December. 
Regarding the data and sample selection, the study is based on companies added to the Euronext 
Vigeo Europe 120 over the period 2013 through 2017. Normally, event studies assume that 
market participants agree on how the news should be interpreted. However, this assumption 
cannot be accepted if one combines index inclusion and exclusion together, because of the 
possible different market responses to each type of news. To identify the different reactions on 
the different events, the index constituents were separated in two groups: the newly added 
stocks and the newly excluded stocks. The first group includes stocks recognized by the index 
as sustainable and the last group includes stocks eliminated from the index for no longer 
meeting the Vigeo criteria, their trading behavior is analyzed separately (table 1 shows the 
distribution of the two groups by the event dates). Over this interval, Vigeo Eiris identifies 166 
different stocks as being added to the Index. For the inclusion analysis, there were 148 
companies considered (136 unique ones) and for the exclusion analysis there were 145 
companies (117 unique ones), the company names and other details are in appendix 1. The 
stocks are from 15 different countries and 11 industry sectors (table 2 & 3). The countries with 
more companies added to the index are the UK (30%) and France (20%) and the largest sector 
is financials (24%). UK and France large representation in the index is due to the countries’ 
large number of public traded companies, their strong commitment in CSR and strict 
regulations. France, for instance, has strong legislations to tackle air pollution, food, plastic 
waste, among others. They implemented the Paris Climate Agreement and promoted 
sustainability to other European countries. Additionally, French companies are set out to reach 
ambitious climate targets (Slavin and Buckman, 2017). In fact, KPMG´s worldwide survey on 
social reporting (2015) presented France as a leader on verified corporate responsibility, with 
more than 95% of companies reporting annually. For the financial sector, adopting CSR 
measures is strategic move as it helps their reputation (gain of credibility) and helps with their 





Table 1 -Frequency of Vigeo Euronext Europe 120 Index inclusions and exclusions per event date. 
 
 
Table 2 & 3- Display of country and industry information on the sample of firms added and deleted from the Index. 
 
In the study process, in the inclusion event, one stock was not included due to the lack of data 
on the required period (Technip). For the exclusion study, there were also some companies not 
considered (Italcementi Spa, Enel Green Power, Corio N.V., Fiat Industrial and Technip). Most 
of them were acquired by other companies just before the exclusion date, in fact, one of them 
was acquired by a company already belonging to the index (e.g. Enel Green Power was acquired 
by Enel) and Fiat Industrial was delisted. The data retrieved from Vigeo-Eiris and Bloomberg 
was treated to address the question of how a particular event- index inclusion (exclusion) 
announcement- changes a firm’s value by quantifying the effect on the respective stock price. 
Vigeo-Eiris organizes the companies by their names and ISIN codes. During the time period 
considered there were some name changes (e.g. France telecom to Orange or GDF SUEZ to 
Engie) and some ISIN code changes (e.g. Red Electrica, Arcelor Mittal or Johnson Matthey). 
For the purpose of this study, any name and ISIN change during the period was not considered 
to be a large event, with no significant impact on the value of the firms. Even more the events 
did not coincide with the event date in question for each company, therefore, the stocks are not 
excluded. Later, the stocks were identified by their tickers in order to retrieve their daily returns 
from Bloomberg. In the end, the sample included 166 unique stocks. The financial data was 
collected from Bloomberg and the non-financial data was collected from Vigeo-Eiris website. 
Vigeo is the Europe’s leading supplier of extra-financial analysis, and measures company´s 













Nº#of#Index#Additions Nº#of#Index#Exclusions Total Frequency
Belgium 1 4 5 2%
Denmark 3 4 7 2%
Finland 6 5 11 4%
France 36 24 60 20%
Germany 14 14 28 10%
Ireland 1 0 1 0%
Italy 6 7 13 4%
Luxembourg 1 0 1 0%
Norway 3 3 6 2%
Portugal 3 3 6 2%
Spain 10 9 19 6%
Sweden 10 10 20 7%
Switzerland 7 7 14 5%
The#Netherlands 7 8 15 5%
United#Kingdom 40 47 87 30%
148 145
Nº#of#Index#Additions Nº#of#Index#Exclusions Total Frequency
Communications 8 12 20 7%
Consumer#Discretionary 23 21 44 15%
Consumer#Staples 10 5 15 5%
Energy 4 7 11 4%
Financials 40 31 71 24%
Healthcare 5 9 14 5%
Industrials 13 13 26 9%
Materials 24 25 49 17%
Technology 10 13 23 8%
Telecommunications 0 1 1 0%





such as Euronext Vigeo Europe 120, are composed of the highest-ranking listed companies 
evaluated by their agency in terms of corporate responsibility performance. It includes all 
companies that are part of the European Equitics Universe, which covers “the 500 issuers 
amongst the largest free-float market capitalizations in Europe”.  The index considered in the 
study is the Euronext Vigeo Europe 120, it is a price index traded in the market with the symbol 
ENVEU. The index selection is based on data from Equitics methodology, which Vigeo has 
developed itself. In their words, it is a robust and stable methodology, based on international 
standards. It is constructed around 38 criteria (appendix 2), divided into six CSR areas 
(Environment, Human Resources, Human Rights, Business Behavior, Community Involvement 
and Corporate Governance). A company will be excluded from the index if their level of 
commitment is considered insufficient which is translated into a company´s overall score of the 
six areas. Also, a company is excluded if it is involved in recurrent controversies and shows no 
intentions to take corrective attitudes. The review of the index is done semi-annually and 
implemented on the last trading day of May and November, after the markets close (VigeoEiris 
website).  
 
Following MacKinlay (1997) approach, there are several steps to consider when conducting an 
event study. First, the identification of the event of interest, and its timing. The index 
announcement is a semi-annual event and in our study, it takes place from 1st June 2013 to 1st 
of December 2017. When the index composition announcement occurs on a weekend day or 
after the market closes, day “0” is considered to be the next business/ trading day (appendix 3). 
Secondly, there is a need to define the event window. It should be noted that the power to detect 
abnormal returns decreases as the horizon of the event study increases. In order to have a 
complete overview, four different lengths of event windows are analyzed: shorter period of 3 
days [-1, +1] or 11 days [-5, +5] and a longer period of 21 days [-10, +10] or 41 days [-20, +20]. 
In similar studies, the event window is defined on multiple days, many times including only the 
previous and next day [-1, +1]. In fact, Fama (1998) believed that long-term event windows 
could not capture the true movement caused by the event, he suggests a period of few days after 
it. However, regarding this study, it also makes sense to have a broader event window to clearly 
identify the permanence of the effect. Benninga, (2014) states that an event window starts a few 
days before the actual event, with the length of the window being around 3, 5 or even 10. In 
fact, according to his book, it will allow to investigate pre-event leakage information. Thus, I 
considered one event window of 3 days (Fama, 1998), one of 11 days as suggested by Brown 




and Campbell et al. (1997). The short-run window will allow us to see if the new information 
triggers any immediate response in the market; the intermediate window will let us see whether 
the effect is delayed in time or whether it is permanent. Furthermore, it is of interest to define 
the estimation window, in order to predict the stock return in the absence of the event in 
question. MacKinlay and Campbell et al. (1997) suggest using either 250 days or 120 days 
when using daily data and the market model parameters. On the other hand, Benninga, (2014) 
suggests as a rule of thumb a minimum estimation window of 126 days. In this study, I follow 
Benninga suggestion of 126 days, as it is consistent with both studies. Considering an 
estimation window of 250 trading days could lead to wrongful and biased results. As the events 
dates are semi-annually, we could be including past event occurrences in the estimation. For 
instance, when studying the exclusion effect, we can have a company that is added to the index 
in event 1 and excluded in event 2, having 250 days estimation would include the index effect 
of event 1 when computing the expected returns, this would lead to overlapping and biased 








Fig. 1-Event study timeline 
 
The next step, is the sample selection, detailed above. Then, abnormal returns are estimated 
according to three models: Market model, Fama French (3 factor-model) and Carhart Model (4 
factor- model). Performing several models will allow to compare different results and to check 
for robustness. For consistency, I used the information on the Kenneth French website 
(European factors) to get the values of market return for the market model, also, SMB and HML 
factors to apply the Fama French model as well as the momentum factor used in the Carhart 
Model. Fama French only had data available up to 31st of May 2018, for that reason the last 
event day (1st June 2018) had to be cut out of the study. In the end, there were only 10 dates to 
be considered. During the analysis, it was clear that there was a mismatch of dates, some stocks 
had no return information on some dates. There are several techniques to solve this issue. One 
solution is to remove the companies with missing returns (it is commonly done in single-
country event studies (e.g. Eades et al., 1985)), nonetheless, doing it would greatly reduce the 
sample size. Another solution is to use the stock returns from succeeding days to replace the 
missing days, to do that an average of the succeeding period can be computed over the missing 




so in order to minimize the loss of observations, I follow the procedure done by Brown and 
Warner (1985) and Sorokina and Thornton (2011). Both studies suggest using the available data 
and omit the missing dates from the analysis. It is a preferable technique when the missing 
values are just a few days.  
Moreover, to test the last two hypotheses, the data was divided into two groups. To test cross-
country variation, the stocks were divided in Western (W) and Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) as suggested in the literature and using as a second criteria their corruption perception 
index (CPI). The CPI ranks countries on their perceived levels of corruption, scaled from 0 to 
100. High score means low levels of corruption and a more transparent country. It is a proxy 
for how countries might behave in relation to CSR, it is related to how their governments act, 
their ideologies and economic models. Countries with low level of corruption are more open to 
others and to ESG, whereas high corrupt countries will focus more on their own economic 
profit. For research purposes, the countries with high perception score (above 70) are assigned 
to the group W, while the others are assigned to group CEE. It coincides with the division 
suggested in the literature (appendix 7). Most countries added to the index are part of group W, 
as it is expected by their natural good behavior.  
To test cross-industry variation, the sample was divided in highly pressured sector (consumer 
staples, energy, healthcare, industrials and materials) and low pressured sectors 
(communications, consumer discretionary, financials, technology, telecom and utilities). The 
highly pressured sectors are the heavier polluters, those industries are identified by their above 
median waste, soil, water and air pollution measured by their total environmental protection 
expenditures (EPE) scaled by their industry size (appendix 7). The EPE is the money spent on 
all activities purposefully aimed at the reduction of pollution or any other degradation of the 
environment (Eurostat), the more money the sector spends on it, the higher the impact it has on 
the environment and, thus, the need to take corrective actions.  
For each group division, I computed the CAR for several intervals ([-1; -5], [-1; +1] and [+1; 
+5]) and then performed a comparative 2-sample t-test (assuming unequal variances).  
 
An event study differentiates the returns that would have been expected if the analyzed event 
had not happened (normal returns) and the returns that were caused by the event (abnormal 
returns), three models will be used to compare the different results as estimating abnormal 





Market model or index model representation of CAPM, is a typical economic model used to 
estimate stocks returns relying only a stock´s market index (in this model the risk-free rate is 
suppressed, however, it is approximately zero in the interval of dates considered). 
𝒓𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝒓𝑴𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 
𝛼: The average rate of return the stock would realize in a period with a zero-market return. 
𝛽: Stock´s sensitivity to market return. 
𝑟-.: Market rate of return at period t. 
𝜀.: Part of security´s return that comes from firm specific events. 
For the market portfolio, normally, a broad-based stock index is used. The most popular choices 
are the S&P 500 Index, the CRSP Value Weighted Index and the CRSP Equal Weighted Index 
(MacKinlay, 1997). In this study, we are analyzing European stocks that are a part of Euronext 
Vigeo Europe 120, to be consistent with the other models in the study, the market return (for 
european factors) provided by Fama French website is used as the market benchmark. The 
market model is used to adjust the event date return, it removes the influence of the overall 
market, and by assumption, the 𝜀. is unrelated to the overall market, having an expected value 
of zero (Corrado, 2011). Additionally, Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used as it is a consistent 
estimation procedure for the market model parameters.  
 
Fama French takes into consideration that returns can be affected by one market factor and one 
firm-specific factor, while also adding two factors for a firm’s size and book to market value. 
𝒓𝒊,𝒕 − 𝒓𝒇𝒕 = 𝒂𝒊 + 𝜷𝒊𝑴(𝒓𝑴𝒕 − 𝒓𝒇𝒕) + 𝜷𝒊𝑺𝑴𝑩𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝑯𝑴𝑳𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
𝑟𝑓.= risk free rate at period t. 
SMB = Small Minus Big; i.e. the return of a portfolio of small stocks in excess of the return on 
a portfolio of large stocks.  
HML = High Minus Low; i.e. the return of a portfolio of stocks with a high book to market 
ratio in excess of the return on a portfolio of stocks with a low book to market ratio.  
 
The Carhart Model considers the momentum effect when estimating normal returns: 
𝒓𝒊,𝒕 − 	  𝒓𝒇𝒊 = 𝒂𝒊 + 𝜷𝒊𝑴(𝒓𝑴𝒕 − 𝒓𝒇𝒊) + 𝜷𝒊𝑺𝑴𝑩𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝑯𝑴𝑳𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝑴𝑶𝑴𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒕+𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
MOM = Momentum effect; i.e. the difference between winner and loser portfolios in the past. 
The estimated betas in the models show how much the returns are affected by the factors.  
The daily returns are obtained, calculate (𝑹𝒕 =
𝑷𝒕?𝑫𝒕A𝑷𝒕B𝟏
𝑷𝒕B𝟏
) and after the abnormal returns are 
computed: 




𝑅.: Stock return on time t. 
𝑟L,.𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙: Stock return depending on the model used. 
The abnormal return during the event window is used as a measure of the impact the event had 
on the stock. A common assumption used to formulate the statistical significance tests is that 
the abnormal returns are zero. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, the 
expected value will be zero (Corrado, 2011): 𝑯𝟎: 𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎. For the aggregation of stock returns, 
I follow MacKinlay (1997) approach. Aggregating abnormal returns is an extensively used 
procedure to eliminate some potential issues that may arise. One of those problems are cross-
sectional correlation in event time (Gonedes (1973), Blume (1971)). Abnormal returns vary in 
a cross-sectional manner because the event is anticipated differently by each company, in the 
case of more closely followed companies, events should be more predictable, all else equal 
(Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance, 2007). The average abnormal return (AAR) is 
computed for each particular day of the event window, given N events, the sample aggregated 







For the first event window (-1, +1), there are 3 AARs, for the second window (-5, +5), there 
are 11 AARs, for the third window (-10, +10), there are 21 AARs and for the last event window 
(-20, +20), there are 41 AARs. Also, the cumulative abnormal return for each company over 







It is a measure of the total abnormal returns during the event window because it aggregates 
them through time. The cumulative average abnormal return can be calculated by taking the 








For the study to be complete, it is necessary to test the significance of the average abnormal 
return and the cumulative average abnormal return, to do so a cross-sectional test was 
performed for both. A simple test for testing, 𝑯𝟎: 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 = 𝟎 (“The event has no impact on the 





















where 𝑆\YYZ is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal return across the sample and 








If the absolute value of the test statistic is larger than 1.96, then the null hypothesis is rejected, 
meaning the abnormal return is significant at the 95% level (which means that the chances that 
the abnormal return is random or insignificant are less than 5%), (Benninga, 2014). The 
abnormal returns are measured with error and there are two reasons for it: predictions about 
stocks´ unconditional returns are imprecise; and individual stock´s realized returns at the time 
of the event might be affected by factors unrelated to the event itself, which means that this 
component of the abnormal return does not average to precisely zero in the cross-section. 
Additionally, to test for robustness companies’ earnings announcement dates were checked to 
see whether they coincided or not with the event dates in question. This was done to reduce the 
confounding effect of other events.  To test the hypothesis of cross-country and cross-industry 
variation. A 2-sample t-test was conducted. This test is used to determine if two sample means 
are equal. In this case, whether the cumulative abnormal returns differ depending on the part of 
Europe considered (1= Western and 0= CEE) or depending on the industry sector (1= “highly 
pressured” and 0= “low pressured”). It was done on 3 intervals: [-1; -5], [-1; +1] and [+1; +5]. 







The difference is significant if the test statistic is greater than the critical value, 1.96 (∝= 5%). 
Table 4 shows the relation between the AAR of the two groups and its respective t-statistical 
value. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅c ≠ 𝐶𝐴𝑅e |t-statistic|>𝑡cA∝g
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅c > 𝐶𝐴𝑅e t-statistic>𝑡cA∝ 
𝐶𝐴𝑅c < 	  𝐶𝐴𝑅e t-statistic>𝑡∝ 
 





In this section, it is presented the results on the analysis of the effect of Euronext Vigeo Europe 
120 index inclusion and exclusion on the stock performance of the companies involved. First it 
is presented, the statistical results on inclusion, secondly, the results on exclusion, both taking 
into consideration the four event windows and the three models. At the end, there is the 
graphical representation of the results for the two events. In the analysis, the primary concern 
will be the average abnormal returns (AAR) on the days following the event day and the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) before and after the event. The abnormal returns 
across the different events (inclusion and exclusion) are small, never reaching (in absolute 
terms) more than 1%, with the three models showing similar results. Moreover, it is presented 
the results on cross-country and, finally, the results on cross-industry variation. 
The average abnormal returns computed by each model for index inclusion events are presented 
through table 5 to 8 according to the event window considered. The first two tables (5 & 6) are 
relevant to see short-term effects of the index inclusion announcement and the other two tables 
(7 & 8, the latter is in appendix 8) allow us to detect any medium to long-term effects.  
 
 
Table 5- Statistical results for companies added to the index, considering an event window of 3 days, where *** 
is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=148.  
 
Table 6- Statistical results for companies added to the index, considering an event window of 11 days, where 
*** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=148. 
 
Table 5 and 6 present close results for the same interval period [-1,1], table 6 enlarges the scope 
to include more days. All models show mostly significant average abnormal returns at 1% 
significance for the interval considered, which means that the impact of the index inclusion 
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$1 0,58% 3,48 *** 0,37% 2,63 *** 0,35% 2,49 ***
0 $0,08% $0,66 insign $0,11% $0,88 insign $0,17% $1,34 insign
1 0,44% 3,29 *** 0,19% 1,45 insign 0,19% 1,45 insign
MM FF CM
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$5 $0,29% $2,45 *** $0,28% $2,41 *** $0,29% $2,52 ***
$4 $0,33% $2,66 *** $0,23% $1,93 * $0,24% $1,93 *
$3 $0,85% $6,07 *** $0,69% $5,38 *** $0,68% $5,33 ***
$2 $0,82% $5,74 *** $0,75% $6,08 *** $0,70% $5,72 ***
$1 0,55% 3,31 *** 0,39% 2,68 *** 0,36% 2,48 ***
0 $0,07% $0,60 insign $0,09% $0,71 insign $0,19% $1,50 insign
1 0,43% 3,27 *** 0,22% 1,74 * 0,24% 1,82 *
2 0,35% 1,96 ** 0,10% 0,60 insign 0,07% 0,46 insign
3 0,18% 1,50 insign 0,10% 0,86 insign 0,13% 1,10 insign
4 0,47% 2,65 *** 0,32% 2,27 ** 0,30% 2,06 **





announcement was powerful enough to create an excess of returns on the days surrounding the 
event. In fact, the abnormal returns are negative before the announcement, this means that the 
market learns about the imminent inclusion and incorporates the information into the stock 
price. It can be inferred that the market, based on company´s public actions, anticipates the 
inclusion and views it, initially, as bad news (e.g. bad allocation of resources). Chollet and 
Cellier (2011) also noticed a decrease in stock performance before the announcement which 
they attributed to market fluctuations, however, they focused on the moment after the event. 
On the day of the announcement, the impact is insignificant, the announcement does not seem 
to result in abnormal reaction. After the announcement [+4, +5], there is reversal, the impact is 
significantly positive, showing that, apparently, the news resulted in slightly higher returns. 
This might happen because the news on index inclusion are now real/concrete and investors 
might recognize it as a good sign (Robinson et al., 2011). Index inclusion leads to increase 
visibility and signals good behavior translated into higher reputation. These statements are 
assumptions, markets could be reacting to other events (e.g. mergers). Nonetheless, as noted by 
other researchers, the use of short event windows reduces the potential for confounding events 
to interfere with the market reaction (Konchitchki and O’Leary, 2011). 
To conclude, after the announcement it seems that index inclusion is a small positive factor 
affecting stock prices. Being added to the index is an information event, it is expected to have 
a significant impact on stock performance. As firstly hypothesized, the short-term impact was 
expected to be positive, it should be seen by the market as good news and the results confirm 
it.  It could be that investors value positively the index addition (higher visibility), and care that 
the companies they invest are socially and environmentally responsible (good reputation). 
There is no prior literature investigating this particular Vigeo index. A similar study by Cheung 
(2011) finds similar short term positive effects of index inclusion. However, the study is 
different as it tests the impact that DJSI inclusion on U.S. stocks. Another study by Lopez et al. 
(2007) concluded the opposite. There is a short-term negative impact on European companies 
belonging to DJSI when comparing to ones belonging to the general index. Nonetheless, the 
study methodology is quite different.  Moreover, Chollet and Cellier (2011) saw a short-term 
positive effect on stock prices over the 2 days around the Vigeo ratings announcement. It does 





Table 7- Statistical results for companies added to the index, considering an event window of 21 days, where 
*** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=148. 
 
Table 7 presents similar results to the two short-term tables. There are negative abnormal 
returns before the announcement and positive abnormal returns after [+4, +5]. As the interval 
goes wider [+1, +10], there seems to be oscillating AARs. The market is indecisive about the 
news, reacting positively first, then negatively and returning to positive values at the end of the 
interval. In order to have a complete view, a longer event window is analyzed (appendix 8). 
The initial positive reaction could be due to index effect leading to increasing attention to the 
stock; then the negative reaction could be due to the negative impression investors might have 
to the company´s decision to allocate resources to CSR (a superfluous expense) that puts them 
in an economic disadvantage in comparison to other irresponsible firms (Lopez et al. (2007)).  
 
In appendix 8, the table displays a longer interval of abnormal returns (41 days). The results are 
very close to the ones provided by the previous event window (table 7) and as the interval goes 
wider, it becomes apparent the oscillating nature of AAR (visible in graph 3, page 26). For that 
reason, there does not seems to be an effect in the medium-term. This could be because, 
although, investors value the inclusion in the index and CSR efforts, they can also see them as 
unessential expense, leading to confusing market responses in the medium-term. Other similar 
studies could not find impacts on index inclusion for the long-run (Kasch and Sarkar, 2012). 
Additionally, Fama (1998) has explained the difficulty of quantifying the effect as the horizon 
of the interval increases, which is the case.   
 
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$10 $0,58% $3,64 *** $0,51% $3,03 *** $0,54% $3,25 ***
$9 $0,50% $4,03 *** $0,55% $3,07 *** $0,52% $2,89 ***
$8 $0,05% $0,38 insign $0,14% $1,03 insign $0,15% $1,15 insign
$7 0,02% 0,16 insign $0,02% $0,20 insign $0,13% $1,04 insign
$6 $0,21% $1,60 insign $0,15% $1,19 insign $0,14% $1,08 insign
$5 $0,28% $2,29 ** $0,29% $2,47 *** $0,31% $2,55 ***
$4 $0,31% $2,46 *** $0,23% $1,92 * $0,24% $1,93 *
$3 $0,83% $5,92 *** $0,67% $5,26 *** $0,65% $5,11 ***
$2 $0,81% $5,58 *** $0,76% $6,09 *** $0,71% $5,77 ***
$1 0,56% 3,35 *** 0,39% 2,64 *** 0,37% 2,53 ***
0 $0,07% $0,54 insign $0,11% $0,88 insign $0,19% $1,53 insign
1 0,44% 3,32 *** 0,21% 1,62 insign 0,22% 1,64 insign
2 0,38% 2,18 ** 0,11% 0,70 insign 0,10% 0,65 insign
3 0,20% 1,63 insign 0,08% 0,72 insign 0,10% 0,91 insign
4 0,50% 2,87 *** 0,32% 2,27 ** 0,31% 2,09 **
5 0,66% 3,67 *** 0,50% 3,42 *** 0,51% 3,44 ***
6 $0,20% $1,04 insign $0,19% $1,04 insign $0,13% $0,68 insign
7 $0,56% $3,23 *** $0,53% $3,40 *** $0,56% $3,62 ***
8 0,25% 2,50 *** 0,01% 0,07 insign 0,07% 0,68 insign
9 $0,50% $2,70 *** $0,50% $3,10 *** $0,47% $2,87 ***






 Table 9 - Cumulative average abnormal returns for inclusion before and after the event day, considering a 41-days event 
window, where *** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=148. 
 
The table above shows the cumulative impact of the (inclusion) event before and after the index 
composition announcement. Before, the impact is significantly negative, investors react 
negatively to the suspicion (suggesting leakage of information), moreover, as the interval 
considered decreases evidence shows a decreasing negative impact. The market may learn the 
companies will be in the index before the actual event day, and being in the index highlights 
companies´ CSR efforts (perceived bad allocation of resources) (Lopez et al., 2007). After the 
event, the cumulative impact is weak for FF and CM models, being only significantly positive 
for the market model interval [+1, +5].  
 
The results for the exclusion study event are presented in Table 10 to 13. The first two tables 
analyze the short-term effect and the other two (one in appendix 9) the medium-term effect. 
 
Table 10- Statistical results for companies excluded from the index, considering an event window of 3 days, where 
*** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=145. 
 
Table 11- Statistical results for companies excluded from the index, considering an event window of 11 days, 
where *** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=145. 
CAAR t%sat Sign CAAR t%sat Sign CAAR t%sat Sign
CAAR,[%1,%20] %3,41% %5,96 *** %2,90% %3,22 *** %3,51% %3,88 ***
CAAR,[%1;%10] %3,24% %5,66 *** %2,96% %3,30 *** %3,01% %3,34 ***
CAAR,[%1;%5] %1,74% %3,04 *** %1,60% %1,78 * %1,58% %1,75 *
CAAR,[%1;+1] 0,51% 1,53 insign 0,51% 0,57 insign 0,43% 0,48 insign
CAAR,[+1;+5] 2,05% 3,59 *** 1,26% 1,40 insign 1,24% 1,37 insign
CAAR,[+1;+10] 1,01% 1,77 * 0,10% 0,12 insign 0,20% 0,22 insign
CAAR,[+1;+20] 0,50% 0,88 insign %0,53% %0,59 insign %0,51% %0,56 insign
MM FF CM
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$1 0,50% 2,79 *** 0,38% 2,34 ** 0,34% 2,14 **
0 0,20% 1,57 insign 0,23% 1,94 * 0,17% 1,41 insign
1 0,22% 1,36 insign 0,23% 1,46 insign 0,23% 1,51 insign
MM FF CM
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$5 $0,57% $5,31 *** $0,51% $4,66 *** $0,51% $4,70 ***
$4 $0,09% $0,49 insign $0,23% $1,32 insign $0,20% $1,16 insign
$3 $0,28% $2,10 ** $0,31% $2,43 *** $0,30% $2,34 **
$2 $0,36% $1,42 insign $0,79% $2,92 *** $0,75% $2,72 ***
$1 0,48% 2,63 *** 0,37% 2,27 ** 0,33% 2,05 **
0 0,20% 1,57 insign 0,24% 2,08 ** 0,17% 1,43 insign
1 0,20% 1,29 insign 0,23% 1,48 insign 0,24% 1,57 insign
2 $0,70% $3,83 *** $0,78% $4,20 *** $0,81% $4,41 ***
3 $0,34% $3,09 *** $0,41% $3,51 *** $0,38% $3,23 ***
4 $0,22% $1,32 insign $0,36% $2,32 ** $0,40% $2,52 ***





Table 10 and 11 present similar results for the same interval period [-1,1], table 10 enlarges the 
scope to include more days and the 3 models show close results in terms of AAR values. 
Nevertheless, only FF model shows significant positive AAR for the day of the index 
composition announcement (table 11). In general, day 0 and 1 do not seem to have an impact 
on stock performance. As the interval increases, the impact becomes significant. Day 2 to 4 are 
negatively significant, becoming positive in day 5, to have a more comprehensive view, a 
broader interval is considered (table 12). It can be inferred that exclusion from the index is seen 
a bad sign and investors (although not immediately) react negatively to it. A negative reaction 
to index exclusion is expected and it goes in accordance with previous studies (Cheung, 2011).  
 
 
Table 12- Statistical results for companies excluded from the index, considering an event window of 21 days, 
where *** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=145. 
Table 12 and 13 (appendix 9) present the same results as the two short-term windows. As the 
interval goes wider, the results are shown to be negative but insignificant.  In the event period 
of 41-days, is visible the oscillating nature of the average abnormal returns (graph 4, page 26) 
because of that, it can be said that there is no medium-term effect. Companies do not appear to 
be permanently punished for their bad behavior.  
Vigeo analysts analyze companies CSR performances according to their set criteria and rank 
them accordingly. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and a probit model were 
estimated in order to understand whether poor financial performance before the event day was 
correlated with Vigeo´s exclusion decision or not. A poor financial performance could be a 
result of firms’ events or scandals, e.g. Zara was in the spotlight for bad press on its human 
rights violations (child labor) or BP for its oil leakage in the Gulf of Mexico. These events 
AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant AAR T$stat Significant
$10 $0,06% $0,47 insign 0,03% 0,26 insign 0,02% 0,16 insign
$9 $0,91% $6,22 *** $0,73% $5,02 *** $0,73% $5,01 ***
$8 $0,24% $1,64 insign $0,32% $2,27 ** $0,37% $2,63 ***
$7 0,47% 3,35 *** 0,45% 3,37 *** 0,38% 2,78 ***
$6 $0,42% $2,62 *** $0,30% $2,15 ** $0,24% $1,71 *
$5 $0,55% $5,15 *** $0,53% $4,80 *** $0,54% $4,86 ***
$4 $0,08% $0,44 insign $0,26% $1,49 insign $0,24% $1,40 insign
$3 $0,29% $2,12 ** $0,28% $2,22 ** $0,27% $2,08 **
$2 $0,37% $1,39 insign $0,81% $2,98 *** $0,77% $2,82 ***
$1 0,47% 2,56 *** 0,40% 2,39 *** 0,37% 2,22 **
0 0,18% 1,40 insign 0,24% 2,07 ** 0,18% 1,50 insign
1 0,19% 1,20 insign 0,22% 1,41 insign 0,23% 1,47 insign
2 $0,68% $3,76 *** $0,75% $4,03 *** $0,77% $4,18 ***
3 $0,34% $3,16 *** $0,41% $3,52 *** $0,38% $3,25 ***
4 $0,20% $1,20 insign $0,38% $2,43 *** $0,43% $2,66 ***
5 0,89% 4,78 *** 0,80% 5,34 *** 0,82% 5,18 ***
6 $0,16% $0,49 insign $0,11% $0,37 insign $0,04% $0,14 insign
7 $0,18% $1,05 insign $0,14% $0,86 insign $0,18% $1,05 insign
8 0,00% $0,03 insign $0,03% $0,16 insign 0,04% 0,27 insign
9 $0,20% $0,92 insign $0,17% $0,77 insign $0,16% $0,70 insign
10 0,14% 0,81 insign 0,10% 0,55 insign 0,12% 0,69 insign





affect stock price in short periods of time, if events like that occur to the companies considered 
in the index, the negative returns observed might not be driven by index exclusion per se. 
Therefore, to test the possible impact of such events, different time periods of the average 
returns were considered (1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months). At the end, findings 
show insignificant results for all models and time lengths, leading to the conclusion that there 
is no correlation between negative returns and exclusion decision (appendix 10-14). 
 
Table 14- Cumulative average abnormal returns for exclusion before and after the event day, considering a 41-
days event window, where *** is denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, N=145. 
 
The cumulative average abnormal table shows significant negative cumulative returns before 
the announcement day, for all intervals. Evidence shows that exclusion from the index leads to 
a negative response, before day zero. The market suspects the company is underperforming in 
terms of CSR in comparison to previous semester and reacts accordingly. The cumulative 




The graphs below allow for a comparison of the inclusion and exclusion effect. While for a 
short-term interval (3-day) after the announcement, there is clear small positive impact for 
inclusion (0.5%) and almost no impact for exclusion (close to 0%) (graph 1 & 2); the long-term 
interval (41-day), in both cases, does not allow for a definitive conclusion about the effect, due 
to the high fluctuation of average abnormal returns (graph 3 & 4). 
CAAR t%sat Sign CAAR t%sat Sign CAAR t%sat Sign
CAAR,[%1,%20] %3,54% %5,14 *** %4,33% %7,01 *** %4,26% %7,1 ***
CAAR,[%1;%10] %2,07% %3,01 *** %2,44% %3,95 *** %2,39% %4,0 ***
CAAR,[%1;%5] %0,93% %1,34 insign %1,54% %2,50 *** %1,51% %2,5 ***
CAAR,[%1;+1] 0,81% 1,31 insign 0,81% 1,30 insign 0,73% 1,2 insign
CAAR,[+1;+5] %0,04% %0,06 insign %0,60% %0,98 insign %0,62% %1,0 insign
CAAR,[+1;+10] %0,48% %0,70 insign %1,03% %1,66 * %0,89% %1,5 insign
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Graph 1 & 2- – Plot of Average Abnormal Return for the Vigeo Index composition (inclusion & exclusion) 
announcement from event day -1 to event day 1 (estimated using the 3 models), shorter period. 
 
Graph 3 & 4– Plot of Average Abnormal Return for the Vigeo Index composition (inclusion & exclusion) 
announcement from event day -20 to event day 20 (estimated using the 3 models), longer period. 
 
The CAAR plots below show that at some extent the market gradually learns about the 
upcoming announcement. For inclusion, it reacts negatively until the announcement, changing 
its behavior after, to descending and oscillating positive values. For exclusion, it drifts down 
progressively until the day of the event, where it then fluctuates around the same negative value.   
 
  
Graph 5 & 6- Plot of Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for the Vigeo Index composition (inclusion & exclusion) 
announcement from event day -20 to event day 20 (estimated using the 3 models). 
 
An OLS regression was estimated to have an overview of the index impact (in/exclusion) on 
firms. The dependent variable was the average abnormal returns of each stock and the 
explanatory variables were market capitalization, age of the company, industry group and 
country group. Only country group proved to be positively significant, nonetheless, the 
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Moreover, regarding cross-country variation, a quick analysis on each country’s impact on the 
stock performance was done by looking at significance of the mean test. Results show countries 
are only significant for the exclusion event. In particular, Italy (CEE), Denmark (W), Norway 
(W), Switzerland (W) and UK (W). The results show a small negative impact of exclusion in 
the stock performances (around 0.2%), Italy (CEE) having the highest impact (-0.4%) 
(appendix 17). Additionally, a regression was computed in order to understand if size was a 
relevant factor in cross-country variation (appendix 18 & 19). The market capitalization (proxy 
for size), country group and country group times market size (large vs small) were the 
explanatory variables. Results show significant impact for all 3 variables for both events. The 
most negative affected group is CEE small market cap (below 10B) companies followed by 
CEE large market cap companies. However, the R-squared is relatively small (8%). 
Following the division suggested in the literature, a 2-sample t-test was conducted for inclusion 
and exclusion, considering 3 values (CAR [-5; -1], CAR [-1; +1] and CAR [+1; +5)] of the two 
distinctive parts of Europe (Western and Central Europe). Results show mostly insignificant 
effects for both events (appendix 20-21). Only MM, showed a significant effect (at 10%) for 
CAR [-1; +1]. In that interval, CEE companies are negatively effected by being apart of the 
index (-0.43%) whereas W companies are positively effected (1.06%) (appendix 20-A). The 
inclusion seems to yield a positive mean of cumulative abnormal returns [-1; +1] for Western 
companies. These countries tend to be more regulated in CSR and more environmentally 
conscious (Martín, 2009). Companies from those countries will fit the Vigeo´s criteria more 
easily because of government policies and because investing in CSR is not a bad allocation of 
resources, it is a necessary procedure. Additionally, investors tend to invest more in their own 
countries despite the potential gains from international portfolio diversification (Tesar and 
Werner, 1995). Those investors might be environmentally conscious as well, and so, being a 
part of a CSR related index goes in line with their values. On the contrary, for CEE countries, 
there is less regulations and investors are less conscious on those matters, therefore, being added 
to the index might mean bad allocation of resources and less profitability. Furthermore, only 
MM showed significant impact for exclusion for CAR [-5; -1], at 10%.  CEE countries suffer a 
stronger negative cumulative impact on their stocks before the event (-2.63%) in comparison 
with W (-0.67%). Being excluded from the index means something went wrong, perhaps the 
company is not investing in CSR anymore because it does not have sufficient resources, and 




they might predict the exclusion and/or not react so negatively in regard to it. Nonetheless, 
these results could be due to the small sample of firms considered. 
 
Concerning cross-industry variation, it was done a quick analysis on each industry’s impact on 
the stock performance by looking at significance of the mean test. Results show that for 
inclusion, utilities (highly-pressured sector) is the significant one, with a positive impact 
(0.11%), for exclusion, industrials (highly-pressured sector) and communications (low-
pressured) sectors are the most negatively significant ones. Excluding those from the index 
leads to an average decrease of stock price around 0.1%, for each (appendix 22). Additionally, 
a regression was computed in order to understand if size was a factor in cross-industry variation 
(appendix 23 & 24). The market capitalization (proxy for size), industry group and industry 
group times market size (large vs small) were explanatory variables in the model. Results show 
significant impact for all 3 variables, the most negatively affected group is large market cap 
low-pressured companies and followed by small market cap low-pressured companies (only for 
exclusion). Nonetheless, the R-squared is relatively small (5%). 
Furthermore, to test the last hypothesis, a 2-sample t-test was conducted on cross-industry 
variation for inclusion and exclusion. Considering the mean of CAR [-5; -1], CAR [-1; +1] and 
CAR [+1; +5] of highly and low-pressured sector (appendix 25-26).  
Industry group appears to be a differentiator factor when considering the index inclusion. As 
the difference of CAR [-1; +1] between the two industry groups is significant at 5%, for all 3 
models. Considering the Carhart model, highly-pressured companies are positively affected 
(1.27%) while the low-pressured are negatively affected (-0.08%), by the event. The highly-
pressured firms will see a cumulative increase of their returns because the market will perceive 
the addition as proof of good behavior. On the contrary, for the low-pressured firms, the 
allocation of resources in social and environmental preservation is viewed as unnecessary, and 
thus, the strong negative impact. It can also be seen as a marketing strategy to look good and 
improve brand image (e.g. consumer discretionary sector). For exclusion, index impact does 
not seem to depend on the industry sector (the null hypothesis of no difference in mean is not 
rejected). Bråtenius and Melin (2015) concluded the same, they found no significant results in 
their cross-industry analysis. Also, Ahlén and Ahlén (2012) found only impact of CSR in some 
industries (real state, capital goods and healthcare). These results could be due to the small 




Conclusion & Limitations 
 
The objective of this study is to fill a gap on the existing literature by investigating whether 
index inclusion effect has a direct impact on stock prices of European companies belonging to 
the Euronext Vigeo Europe 120 index. The index is used as a proxy for CSR behavior. The 
existence or not of a relationship is an important issue for management. If certain CSR actions 
and investments can improve a company’s chance to be in the index and if that affects positively 
the company´s performance, it is a factor, managers and investors should take into consideration 
when making decisions. Managers can simultaneously satisfy social concerns and shareholder´s 
objectives. In fact, more and more regulatory requirements impose the integration of ESG 
criteria in portfolios, moreover, there has been an increasing interest in sustainability matter as 
there is the belief it can create long-term value for the companies. In this sense, investors can 
differentiate themselves in a highly competitive market by understanding how it is affected by 
a CSR related index. 
The study was conducted by using data made available by Vigeo Eiris on the companies added 
to and eliminated from the index during the period of June 2013 until December 2017. It was 
investigated the index information release impact on the companies, whether the impact was 
visible on the short-run, medium-run, if it depended on the part of Europe considered or the 
industry group. The findings show that addition to the index has no impact on the event date 
itself, it has a small positive impact on the short-run (day 4 and 5) and oscillating values in the 
medium-run. Moreover, exclusion from the index has no impact on the event date itself, it has 
a small negative impact on the short-run (day 2 to 5) and again no medium-run effect. Leading 
to the conclusion that there is a short-term effect (hypothesis 1) and no permanent effect 
(hypothesis 2) caused by the index. Investors do not react on the day, but progressively 
overreact to the news on the short-term, being the effect eliminated in the medium-term. For 
research purposes, the sample was divided in two groups: Western and Central Eastern 
European. For inclusion, Western companies suffered a positive inclusion effect, while Central 
Eastern suffered a negative one, as was first hypothesized (hypothesis 3). The sample was also 
divided in two different sectors: “highly pressured” and “low pressured”, which proved to have 
a differentiator impact on stock performance only for inclusion (hypothesis 4). Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed, there is a significant short-term impact caused by the index effect and by the firm´s 
good CSR efforts. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed, there is no evidence of a medium-term effect, 
due to a difficulty in long horizon analysis.  Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. There is positive impact 
in Western companies for index inclusion effect, because allocating resources to CSR practices 




stronger regulations, it would be expected that they would invest in such practices. On the 
contrary, CSR is a relatively new concept in CEE, investing in it is a superfluous expense. 
Moreover, a CEE company excluded from the index suffers a stronger negative impact because 
it signals decisions internal financial problems as the company can no longer invest in non-
profit activities and it also highlights prior bad management decisions. Hypothesis 4 is partially 
confirmed. High-pressured firms are more positively affected by the index inclusion because 
investing in CSR is more imperative for them, also, they are also under higher scrutiny to 
behave in a responsible manner. For exclusion, no differentiator sector could be determined. 
 
The study, however, presents a few limitations. First, the assumptions used in event study 
methodology are not valid in all circumstances. The markets are not efficient and due to its 
inefficiency, the stock prices may not dully reflect all information. Some information could 
already have been foreseen or co-existing events may also give an effect on the sample. All of 
this could lead to biased stock returns. Consequently, abnormal returns may not be entirely a 
result of market reaction to the event in question. Secondly, another aspect to take into 
consideration is the estimation and event window, considering different estimation windows 
would perhaps lead to different results. Methodology regarding estimation window is confusing 
and determining precise windows is not an easy task, additionally, it is difficult to control for 
other confounding effects the longer the estimation windows are. Thirdly, the data used was 
daily return which was proven to have some issues (e.g. non-normality, dependence, etc) 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). Fourthly, not all stocks are traded every day, some changes in dates 
had to be made. Moreover, the study tried to understand the impact that CSR has on stock 
performance, considering an index related to CSR reputation and assuming a high visibility of 
that index. Additionally, the index had only published information on a small number of 
companies, making the sample size rather small, which can be an issue when generalizing the 
findings.  
As future and complementary approach, it would be of interest to analyze other Euronext Vigeo 
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